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PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: SOME SUGGESTIONS
ON USE AND THE PROBLEM OF PRESUMPTIONS
GEORGE NEFF STEVENS*
Professor Stevens' article had its genesis as a book review of the New
York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil, Vol. 1 and 2 (temporary)
(1965); it soon became apparent, however, that the project was of larger
dimensions than most book reviews. Accordingly, and to facilitate
proper indexing, the editors decided to publish the manuscript as an
article. Professor Stevens critically appraises the New ork pattern
instructions and compares them with those of California, Illinois and
other states. Because of the imminent publication of similar instructions
for Washington, Professor Stevens offers some practical proposals such
as appending federal annotations to pattern instructions for use in diver-
sity cases, and changing present Washington rules and statutes so as to
allow trial court judges more time to consider proposed instructions by
requiring their submission in advance of the time they must be given,
with opportunity for changes and amendments as the circumstances may
warrant. Finally, Professor Stevens offers some suggestions on the use
of presumptions and makes some concrete proposals toward a solution
of the problems they present to Washington courts and attorneys.
The appearance of New York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil and
the imminence of publication of similar instructions for the State of
Washington presents the opportunity to stress some suggestions on the
use of instructions and to propose a solution to the problem of
presumptions.
The New York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil, Volumes 1 and 2,
were prepared by a Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the
Association of Supreme Court Justices of that state. The project was
begun in 1962, at the suggestion of Chief Judge Desmond of the New
York Court of Appeals. As stated by the Committee: "Primarily New
York Pattern Jury Instructions is a working tool for use by counsel in
preparing requests and by the trial judge in preparing his charge. Its
contents, while prepared with the cooperation of the Judicial Confer-
ence, bear no imprimatur. In this respect, the New York approach is
in line with California.' Illinois, on the other hand, by Supreme Court
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of Law. A.B., Dartmouth, 1931; M.A., Uni-
versity of Louisville; LL.B., Cornell Univ., 1935; S.J.D., Michigan, 1951.
1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIO Ns-CIVIL (4th ed. 1959 Supp.) [hereinafter cited
as BAJI]. (This was the first of the present wave of pattern jury instructions. For the
history of the development of pattern jury instructions in California, see BAJI, at
35-46.) BAJI, although widely used throughout the State of California, has been
officially adopted for use only in the Superior Court of California in and for the
County of Los Angeles.
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Rule requires the use of pattern instructions when and where appli-
cable.:
Volume 1 of the New York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil (here-
after referred to as 1 NY PJI) contains an excellent statement on
"How to Use These Volumes." A careful reading of this introductory
material is essential to an understanding, not only of how to use the
prepared instructions, but also of the approach and philosophy of the
committee in preparing the content of each instruction. The format in
the body of the book consists of a black letter charge, followed by a
Comment, and in a few instances footnotes. As stated by the com-
mittee:
The purposes of the Comment are to (1) present the case authority on
which the charge is based and the secondary authorities to which the
user can turn for a broader view of the subject, (2) orient the user to the
relation of the charge to the general topic with which it deals and to other
charges with which it should be or may be used, (3) inform the user of the
assumptions made in the preparation of the charge, (4) point up when
the question dealt with is for the court and when for the jury, (5) in-
dicate what the commonly encountered variations in the factual complex
are and state in what way a particular variation will require the pattern
charge to be changed (in some instances, as above noted, the revision or
alternative form of charge is included and signalled by black letter
printing). In those instances where the Coordinating Committee of
United States District Court Judges felt that it might be of value to have
a separate statement of the federal authorities, a separate paragraph,
headed Federal Annotation, is set forth at the end of the Comment.
Because of the potential for use of pattern jury instructions in diversity
cases, the federal annotation to the Comment is an innovation worthy
of emulation.'
The Illinois format differs in that the "How To Use" portion of the
comment is placed in a Note on Use which is set forth below the
instruction and above a Comment which covers the authorities, 'as-
sumptions and possible variations. I prefer the Illinois approach for
the reason that a properly prepared Note on Use should save the time
of both lawyers and judges by making it unnecessary to read the Com-
ment in order to ascertain use.
In preparing the content of the pattern instructions the New York
committee was guided by the same considerations which have in-
2 ILLINOIS PATTERN JURy INSTRUCTIONS, _v-xx (1961) [hereinafter cited as IPI];
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 25-1 (a), Instructions in Civil Cases.
3 Devitt, Ten Practical Suggestions about Federal Jury Instructions, 38 F.R.D.
75 (1965).
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fluenced this movement generally: to state the governing principles
accurately, but in lay language; to omit matters which the jury is not
required to know; to avoid the appearance of favoring either side; and
to charge affirmatively rather than negatively.' Substantive law
teachers, as well as lawyers and judges with cases governed by the
law of a sister state, would do well to follow the suggestion of the New
York committee-to look at the sister state's pattern jury instructions
and supporting comments as a way of saving a great deal of research
effort in finding the law of the sister state.
Typically, the first series of pattern jury instructions in New York
covered general charges (Division 1), negligence actions (Division 2),
and landlord and tenant (Division 6). Yet to come are torts other than
negligence (Division 3), contracts (Division 4), divorce (Division 5),
and will contests (Division 7). Of particular interest to lawyers else-
where is the excellent treatment of Products Liability, 1 NY PJI
2:120 through 2:146. A host of specific negligence actions, such as
motor vehicle accidents, liability for condition or use of land, mal-
practice, and public utilities, are included in volume 1, as are vicarious
responsibility and third-party-liability-over situations. The coverage
is thorough and the Comments indicate homework exceedingly well-
done.
The draftsmen of NY PJI have made a start towards implementing
recent proposals which advocate the giving of appropriate charges
prior to trial, in NY PJI 1:1 through 1:14. Ample support for not
only the proposed preliminary instructions, but also for a more exten-
sive pretrial charge, including substantive aspects of the particular
case, is cited in the Introductory Statement." The need for and validity
of such instructions is clearly stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Izzo:
No litigant has a right, constitutional or otherwise, to have his case
tried before ignorant jurors. To acquaint the juror with his duties and
4 For a more complete discussion of this aspect of pattern jury instructions, see
Corboy, Pattern Jury Instructions-Their Functions and Effectiveness, 32 INs.
COUNSEL J. 57 (1965); Dooley, Jury Instructions: An Appraisal by a Plaintiff's
Attorney, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 586; Fowler, Jury Instructions: An Appraisal by a
Defendant's Attorney, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 612; Hannah, Jury Instructions: An Ap-
praisal by a Trial Judge, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 627; Yerkes, Illinois Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions-Civil, 47 A.B.A.J. 505 (1961) ; Yerkes, Standardized Jury Instructions in Cali-
fornia, 5 ST. Louis U.L.J. 347 (1959); Note, Pattern Jury Instructions, 40 N. DA.
L. REV. 164 (1964).
1 NY PJI 8. See People v. Izzo, 14 Ill. 2d 203, 209, 151 N.E2d 329, 334 (1958),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 403 (1960) ; Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 197; Backer, Instructions to
the Jury at the Comnencement or End of the Trial, 1961 N.Y.L.J. 4; Prettyman,
Jury Instructions-First or Last?, 46 A.B.A.J. 1066 (1960).
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responsibilities in a new environment and to increase his understanding
of the processes of a trial can hardly be objectionable .... 6
To accomplish this very worthy improvement in cases tried to a jury
some states, as for example, Washington, may have to make some
changes in the wording of controlling rules or statutes.7
Attention should be given by the draftsmen of pattern jury instruc-
tions to the inclusion, either in the Notes on Use or in the introductory
material on how to use pattern jury instructions, of information as to
those specific instructions which should or could be given during trial.
This possibility was recognized by the New York committee,' and
implemented rather half-heartedly in the first paragraph of the Com-
ment to NY PJI 1:65. Why this reluctance to suggest the giving of
appropriate information or cautionary instructions during the trial?
For example, why should not NY PJI 1:90, General Instruction-
Expert Witness, be given the first time an expert witness is called in the
case? ' This is, both logically and practically, the time when the jury
needs the instruction in order to evaluate correctly the testimony of
the witness.'
The development of pattern jury instructions should lead to a further
improvement in the administration of justice. Under existing practices
proposed instructions and requests to charge are normally submitted
to the judge at the close of the evidence." All too frequently the
attorneys, understandably, wait until the very last minute to make
6 14 Ill. 2d 203, 209, 151 N.E2d 329, 334 (1958).
7 Presently in Washington, requirements with respect to instructions are embodied
in WAsH. R. PLEAD., PRAC., PROC. 51.04W, 51.08W and 51.16W. The language of rule
51.08W requires the court to reduce the charge to be given to the jury to writing and
to read the written charge to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence. A modification
of the rule is clearly indicated if the proposal for giving appropriate instructions prior
to or during trial is found advisable, as I trust it will be. As to whether preliminary
and interim instructions should be reduced to writing, it is suggested that they should
be, for, although the Washington Supreme Court has held that oral instructions are not
improper insofar as ordinary admonitions to the jury are involved, written instructions
are required with respect to the substantive aspects of the case. Greene v. Rothschild,
60 Wn. 2d 508, 512, 374 P.2d 566, 569 (1962). A requirement that instructions, regard-
less of when given, be reduced to writing would eliminate the necessity of litigating
whether a particular instruction was merely admonitory or involved substantive law.
8 1 NY PJI 1, in the quotation from the third provisional draft of the Trial
Judge's Code, now in the course of preparation by the National Conference of State
Trial Judges: "... and provide appropriate instructions before, during as well as after
the evidence."0 Rather than, at the close of the case, giving an instruction which starts out: "You
will recall that the witness (es) state name(s)] . . " which in a long and compli-
cated case might well create some problems of accurate recollection. Other examples
may well be found among the General Instructions Not Applicable to All Cases.
NY PJI 1:50-93.
10 Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HASTINGs L.J. 456 (1962).
"1 Under N.Y. CPLR 4017, requests to charge must be made "before the jury
retires to consider its verdict"
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their requests. As a result, the trial judge, under pressure to get the
case to the jury so that he can take another assignment, has little time
to give the submitted instructions the careful attention they deserve,
and very little time and stenographic help to prepare his written
instructions for delivery to the jury. Pattern jury instructions, where
available and used, will help to eliminate, at least in part, this present
weak spot in the trial of jury cases. But, this very availability of
pattern jury instructions offers the opportunity for further improve-
ment by either requiring or encouraging the submission of proposed
instructions well in advance of the time when the judge must act.'2
Chief Judge Devitt of the United States District Court, District of
Minnesota, has suggested the possibility of accepting well-prepared
and documented instructions as a substitute for a trial brief.' An
opportunity to submit further instructions, made necessary by trial
developments, should, of course, be provided. This could be accom-
plished with a minimum of effort and inconvenience at a conference on
instructions at the close of the evidence.
The draftsmen of pattern jury instructions, inevitably, must face
the problem of what to do with presumptions. As every legally trained
person knows,' the courts, the lawyers, and legal scholars have been
arguing about the purpose and function of presumptions for years."
Because of the fascination of the problem, perhaps, the legal pro-
12 See FED. R. Ci. P. 51 ; Ill. Supreme Court Rule 25-1 (b) : "At any time before
or during the trial, the Court may direct counsel to prepare designated instruc-
tions...." Speaking of this rule, in discussing the trial judge's role, in Foreword to
Illiniois Pattern Jury Instructions, at xvii, the Illinois committee states:
The rule contemplates the following:
1. At the close of the Plaintiff's case or such other convenient time as the
Court may select ("at any time ... during the trial") the Court may direct
counsel to prepare designated instructions.
2. As early as the pre-trial hearing ("at any time before ... trial") the Court
may direct counsel to prepare designated instructions.
3. The practical problem of having the Court's instructions prepared is solved
by making it the duty of counsel to provide this stenographic service. Given
sufficient notice, the lawyers are equipped to provide this stenographic service,
while few courts can do so.
13 Devitt, Ten Practical Suggestions about Federal Jury Instructions, 38 F.R.D.
75 (1965).
14 Readers of the Washington Law Review need go no further for source material:
Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REv. 71 (1940) ; McCormick, What
Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions, 13 VASH. L. REv. 185
(1938); Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1937) ; Wiehl, Instructing
a Jury in Washington, 36 WASH. L. Rlv. 378 (1961) ; Note, 35 WASH. L. Rrx. 249
(1960).
15 The Thayer view-that a presumption is a preliminary assumption of fact that
disappears from a case upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREAT'sE
oN EvIDENcE 313-25 (1898) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 2485-91 (3d ed. 1940) ; adopted
by MODEL CODE OF EviDENcE rule 704 (1942).
The Morgan-McCormick view-that a presumption should shift the burden of
[VoL. 41 :282
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fession seems to have overlooked the damaging effects of its failure to
resolve the issue. Litigants should not be put to the expense of provid-
ing a forum for either further consideration of these well-known and
thoroughly debated views or for the case to case classification of
particular presumptions. The improvement of the administration of
justice calls for an end to the debate. Lower court judges and lawyers
should be able to determine with relative ease what the law permits
and requires with respect to instructions on presumptions, and thus
be able to avoid costly and unnecessary reversible error. The time has
come for the promulgation by the supreme court, under its rule making
power,"0 of a set of rules defining and classifying all known presump-
tions in a practical and meaningful manner, keeping in mind that the
problem springs from the jury system and that the solution should
assure the most practical and intelligent use of the jury that can be
devised.'1
The absence of a workable, easily understood definition and classi-
fication of presumptions is readily apparent in the pattern jury instruc-
tions on presumptions prepared by the New York group. For example,
the Comment to 1 NY PJI 1:63, General Instructions-Burden of
Proof-Effect of Presumption, warns that care must be taken to
analyze the particular presumption under consideration to ascertain
whether (1) it aids the person who has the burden of proof by shifting
to the opposing party the burden of going forward with evidence
(producing evidence), or (2) it is simply another way of stating upon
proof to the adverse party. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 81 (1956) ; McCoR-
MICe, EviDENcE § 317, at 671-72 (1954) ; note 14 supra.
The Bohlen or Pennsylvania vieze--that the Thayer view is correct as to some
presumptions, and the Morgan-McCormick view is right as to others. Bohlen,
The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U.
PA. L. REv. 307 (1920); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 13-16 and comments. The
classification of presumptions in the new California Evidence Code is based on this
view. CAL. LAW REVISION CoMM'N, RECOMMENDATION PROPOSING AN EVIDENcE
CoDE 95 (1965).
16In Washington, see WASH. REv. CODE §§ 2.04.190, .020, 3.30.080 (1954). For
the inherent power of the Washington Supreme Court, see State ex rel. Foster-
Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770 (1928). See
generally American Judicature Society Information Sheet No. 28, The Rule-Making
Power of State Supreme Courts (April 21, 1964).17 Washington has the agency at hand to perform this difficult task-the Wash-
ington Judicial Council. It will find a great deal of the spade work done in the
collection of cases involving presumptions in Professor Meisenholder's new book,
WASHINGTON PRACTICE-EvIDENCE chs. 31 & 32 (1965). For a start and an excellent
example of what can and should be done, see CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, Op. cit.
supra note 15, at 93-113. The recommendations, with several unfortunate changes, were
adopted by the California legislature, and will become effective January 1, 1967. Cal.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 299. It should be noted that the California proposal came by way
of their Law Revision Commission because California is one of the three western states
where the rule-making power is still exercised by the legislature. See note 16 supra.
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whom rests the burden of proof, or (3) it actually shifts the burden
of proof (burden of persuasion). With respect to (2) above, the
Comment suggests that there is no need for an instruction on such a
presumption since the burden of proof charge is sufficient."5 Yet, the
proposed instruction set forth in 1 NY PJI 2:11, covering the common
law standard of care-negligence defined-where plaintiff is under
disability, is nothing more than another way of stating plaintiff's
burden of proof with respect to that particular aspect of the case;
and thus, it is a departure from the position taken in the Comment
to NY PJI 1: 63.
The Comment to NY PJI 1: 63 also discusses a very important and
practical problem in applying the Thayer theory of presumptions.
Should the jury be instructed, and if so how, on what might be classified
as a rebuttable mandatory presumption, 9 which affects the burden of
going forward (the production of evidence),20 where the opponent has
produced evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the non-existence
of the presumed fact, but where the weight of such evidence is for the
jury? The Thayer followers, presumably, would say that no instruction
should be given.2 The Comment to the New York proposal, wisely in
my opinion, suggests that, because of the right of the jury to weigh the
contrary evidence and not to believe it, there should be an instruction
where these conditions are present.22 NY PJI 1:63 includes a sensible
instruction both as to what the jury is to do if it does not believe the
evidence offered to disprove the presumed facts and what it is to do if
it believes that the evidence offered reasonably tends to disprove the
presumed facts.
Finally, the Comment to NY PJI 1:63 contains a list of presump-
tions which shift the burden of going forward (producing evidence),2
and of presumptions which shift the burden of proof.2 4 The Comments
18 Accord, Wiehl, supra note 14, at 391-92. See also Graving v. Dorm, 63 Wn. 2d 236,
386 P.2d 621 (1963).
19 See MCCORMICK, EvMENCE § 308 (1954).
20 d. § 306 (1954).
21 See Bates v. Bowles White & Co., Inc., 56 Wn. 2d 374, 353 P.2d 663 (1960).22 Accord, Wiehl, supra note 14, at 395-96. Interestingly, the possibility of an issue
of fact as to the age of a child under 4 was not mentioned in the Comment to 1 NY PJI
2:23. If such an issue is raised, it would seem that a NY PJI 1:63 instruction would
be in order.
23 (1) Because of social policy: a presumption of undue influence arises from
illicit sexual cohabitation; (2) because the evidence is more readily available to
the opponent: NY PJI 1:63 and the presumption arising in bailment cases, from proof
that property was in good condition when delivered to the bailee and when returned was
damaged in a way that could not result from wear and tear, that the damage was occa-
sioned through the fault or neglect of the bailee.
24 Because of probabilities predicated on the general conduct of mankind: the
presumption against suicide and in favor of sanity; the presumption of receipt of a
[VoL. 41 :282
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following other pattern instructions contain references to other pre-
sumptions which shift the burden of going forward (producing evi-
dence)," to presumptions which the Comments do not attempt to
classify,2 to a few examples of those presumptions which are just
another way of stating upon whom rests the burden of proof,27 and to
examples of judicial denials of, or refusal to recognize, the existence of
a claimed presumption.25
The New York Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil contain specific
instructions on the presumptions which may be drawn from the failure
to produce witnesses: in general,29 from the failure to produce wit-
nesses-claim of privilege,3" from the failure to produce documents,3
on res ipsa loquitur, 32 on owner-passenger liability for acts of driver,33
and on the presumption of a promise on the part of a tenant to pay the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises,34 in addition
to the presumption from proof of ownership that the automobile was
being operated with owner's permission,3" and the presumption against
suicide,3" mentioned above.
Thus, the New York approach to instructions on presumptions has
been by way of inclusion where appropriate in each subject matter
letter or telegram arising from proof of mailing or delivery for transmission; the
statutory presumption of receipt of summons served by registered mail upon a
nonresident.
25 Comment to: NY PJI 2:22, that falling asleep while driving raises a presump-
tion of negligence; NY PJI 6:3, that when a person other than the lessee is shown
to be in possession, there is a presumption that the lease has been assigned to him
and that the assignment was sufficient to transfer the term and to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds, with a specific instruction that the instruction should be given along
NY PJI 1:63 lines.
26 NY PJI 2:111, presumption of permission from long continued use of public
land without objection from the public authority; NY PJI 2:113, presumption that
building placed on plaintiff's land increased the pressure on the soil, and burden is
on the plaintiff to show otherwise; NY PJI 2:225, presumption that a pedestrian,
using a sidewalk, should see what is there to be seen; NY PJI 6:36, statutory
presumption of use with permission of lessee upon proof of ill-repute or ill-fame of
the premises or of the inmates thereof, or of those resorting thereto.
27 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
2-3 NY PJI 2:23 and again in NY PJI 2:48, that a child over four and up to any
particular age is not chargeable with contributory negligence; NY PJI 2:112,
blasting, no presumption from the occurrence of damage that the work was negligently
done; NY PJI Independent Contractor, Introductory Statement, at 425, no pre-
sumption of delegation of duty by owner or contractor to another; NY PJ1 2:258, no
presumption of incompetence arises from the negligent act which injured plaintiff;
NY PJI 2:260, no presumption from the relationship of child and parent that child
was the agent of the parent.
2O 1 NY PJI 1:75.
301 NY PJI 1:76.
3' 1 NY PJI 1:77.
32 1 NY PJI 2:65.
331 NY PJI 2:251.
34 2 NY PJI 6:2.
31 1 NY PJI 1:63.
301 NY PJI Comment to 1:63.
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division or chapter, rather than through the preparation of a separate
chapter or division devoted to adaptable pattern jury instructions on
presumptions as such. The Comment to 1 NY PJI 1:63 did suggest
the possibility of adapting that instruction to other Thayerian pre-
sumptions. But, the idea went no further. The Illinois pattern jury
instructions, which have served as a model for pattern jury instructions
elsewhere, approach the problem of instructions in the same way as
did New York." California, on the other hand, tried the pattern
approach, but without the adaptability factor."
The reason for this reluctance to prepare adaptable pattern pre-
sumption instructions probably stems from the complete lack of any
system of classification of presumptions in the vast majority of states
upon which such instructions could be predicated with any degree of
certainty as to their validity.39 But, while we await the solution above
suggested," it is suggested that Washington experiment with pattern
jury instructions adapted to a classification which is discernible in the
Washington cases and which is the base upon which the new California
Evidence Code was built.
Since there must be a beginning, we start by defining a presump-
tion.4 Rule 13, Uniform Rules of Evidence, defines a presumption as
"'an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such
fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts founded or
otherwise established in the action."4 2 This definition makes it clear
that we are not dealing with the mental process of drawing inferences
from evidence but with the legal process of presuming facts from other
facts.4 It would eliminate permissive presumptions," with one very
37 ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (IPI) : IPI No. 5.01, Failure to Produce
Evidence or a Witness; IPI No. 10.08, Careful Habits as Proof of Ordinary Care--
Death Cases; IPI No. 11.03, Presumption That Child Under Seven Years is Incapable
of Contributory Negligence; IPI No. 22.01, Res Ipsa Loquitur; IPI No. 50.07, Infer-
ence of Agency-Agency and Scope of Employment Inferred from Ownership of Auto-
mobile.
381 CALIFORNIA JuRY INSTRUTIONs-CIvIL (BAJI) (4th ed. 1959 Supp.). Users
will note subsequent changes in this approved instruction in the 1964 supplement.
Furthermore, the adoption of the new California Ezidence Code in 1965, note 17
supra, has rendered additional parts of this instruction improper.
39 See, e.g., Wiehl, supra note 14, at 386-96.
40 See text accompanying notes 16 and 17 supra.
41 This will be difficult in Washington. See Wiehl, supra note 14, 386-87.
42 Compare CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 600 (a).4 3 Comment to Rule 13, UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE.
44Accord, Wiehl, supra note 14, at 387-90. But see McCoamicK, EVIDENCE
639-49 (1954). For purposes of this proposal, an instruction should not be given on
permissive presumptions even though neither the basic nor the presumed facts have
been challenged, for the reason that the permissive presumption has served its purpose
by taking the case to the jury and making possible a finding of the presumed fact, but
[VoL. 41 :282
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important exception."
Next, presumptions should be classified as conclusive,," or rebut-
table,47 and rebuttable presumptions should be classified as either a
presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence"8 or a presump-
tion affecting the burden of proof. 9 This is, basically, the new Cali-
fornia approach, and it is implemented by clear and concise provisions
defining the effect of each type of presumption.0
Lacking such provisions, we are, nevertheless, by using these classifi-
cations in a position to draft pattern instructions with some degree of
assurance as to their validity.
A. Conclusive Presumptions:
The Instruction:
If you find [here insert the basic facts] (as for example, that the
child is under six years of age), then you must find [the presumed
it is not determinative of the issue. Therefore, the permissive presumption has served
its purpose by getting the case to the jury. State v. Lew, 26 Wn. 2d 394, 399-400, 174
P.2d 291, 293 (1946) (presumption that ownership, once proved, continues) ; State v.
Hatfield, 65 Wash. 550, 118 Pac. 735 (1911) (presumption of defendant's knowledge
of falsity from the mere uttering of a forged instrument).
If res ipsa loquitur is properly classified as a permissive presumption (jury may
find), rather than a mandatory presumption (jury must find), then no instruction
should be given on res ipsa loquitur, whether the basic facts are challenged or not.
Tuengel v. Stobbs, 59 Wn. 2d 477, 367 P.2d 1008 (1962) ; Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn. 2d
58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959) ; Nopson v. Wockner, 40 Wn. 2d 645, 245 P.2d 1022 (1952).
But see Crippen v. Pulliam, 61 Wn. 2d 725, 380 P.2d 475 (1963).
45 The exception: rebuttable presumptions, statutory or otherwise, that establish
an element of a crime. In this instance a charge that the statutory inference is
mandatory upon a finding of the basic facts would be unconstitutional. United States
v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); State v. Person, 56 Wn. 2d 283, 352 P2d 189 (1960).
For an excellent discussion of this problem, see CAL. LAW REv sION CoM m', op. cit.
supra note 15, at 98, 101-05.
Unfortunately, the California Legislature chose to disregard this proposal in
enacting the new Evidence Code. See § 607 of the act.
4 Conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary rules, but rather are rules of
substantive law. McComaicC, EVIDmCE 640, n2 (1954) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2492
(1940). See CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§ 601, 620.
47 This term serves one purpose only-to indicate that the presumption may be
met and overcome by competent evidence. See generally 9 WIGmopE, EVIDENCE
§ 2491 (1940).
'1 CAL. EVMENCE CODE § 603:
A presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is a presumption
established to implement no public policy other than to facilitate the determination
of the particular action in which the presumption is applied.
J9 CAL. EViDENCE CODE § 605:
A presumption affecting the burden of proof is a presumption established to
implement some public policy other than to facilitate the determination of the
particular action in which the presumption is applied, such as the policy in
favor of the legitimacy of children, the validity of marriage, the stability of
titles to property, or the security of those who entrust themselves or their property
to the administration of others.
50 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 604, Effect of presumption affecting burden of producing
evidence; § 606, Effect of presumption affecting burden of proof. See CAL. LAw
REVISION Comm'x, op. cit. supra note 15, at 98, 100-01.
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fact] (as for example, for the child on the issue of his contributory
negligence).
Note on use:
This instruction should be used only where the basic facts of a
conclusive presumption are in issue, such as where the age of the
child is in dispute.51
Comment:
If there is no dispute as to the basic facts of a conclusive pre-
sumption, no instruction on the presumption is required. The point
will be adequately covered in instructions on the law of the case."
B. Rebuttable (i.e., Non-Conclusive) Presumptions, which affect the
burden of producing evidence: 3
1. Where neither the basic facts nor the presumed facts have been
challenged:
The instruction:
If you find [the basic facts], then you must find [the presumed
facts].
Note on Use:
This instruction should be given where evidence of the basic
facts has been introduced and no contrary evidence has been
introduced by the opponent, and yet the court is of the opinion
that the jury should be permitted to decide whether or not to
believe the evidence in support of the basic facts.
Comment:
Even uncontradicted evidence is not binding on a jury when
51 In Washington, a child under six cannot be contributorily negligent. Cox v.
Hugo, 52 Wn. 2d 815, 329 P.2d 467 (1958). The new California Evidence Code
specifically classifies the following presumptions as conclusive: § 621, Legitimacy;
§ 622, Facts recited in a written instrument; § 623, Estoppel by own statement or
conduct; § 624, Estoppel of tenant to deny title of landlord.
52 Von Saxe v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 217 Pac. 62 (1923) ; Miller v. Supreme
Tent of the Maccabees, 108 Wash. 689, 185 Pac. 593 (1919) ; Bullock v. Yakima Valley
Transp. Co., 108 Wash. 413, 184 Pac. 641 (1919) ; Peters v. Casualty Co. of America,
101 Wash. 208, 172 Pac. 220 (1918).
53 The new California Evidence Code specifically classifies the following pre-
sumptions as among those affecting the burden of producing evidence; § 631, Money
delivered by one to another; § 632, Thing delivered by one to another; § 633, Obliga-
tion delivered up to the debtor; § 634, Person in possession of order on himself;
§ 635, Obligation possessed by creditor; § 636, Payment of earlier rent or install-
ments; § 637, Ownership of things possessed; § 638, Ownership of property by person
who exercises acts of ownership; § 639, Judgment correctly determines rights of
parties; § 640, Writing truly dated; § 641, Letter received in ordinary course of
mail; § 642, Conveyance by person having duty to convey real property; § 643,
Authenticity of ancient document; §644, Book purporting to be published by public
authority; § 645, Book purporting to contain reports of cases.
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the jury can find circumstances inconsistent with it; and a jury
is not at all bound to believe interested testimony. 4
2. Where the basic facts have been challenged, but not the presumed
facts:
The Instruction:
If you find [the basic facts], then you must find [the presumed
facts].
Note on Use:
This instruction should be given in those instances where the
existence of the basic facts is an issue for the jury.5
3. Where the presumed facts have been challenged:
The Instruction:
The [defendant] [plaintiff] concedes [the basic facts], but has
introduced evidence challenging [the presumed facts]. From the
concession of [the basic facts], the law presumes [the presumed
facts]. You must find [the presumed facts] unless you believe
evidence which you find reasonably tends to prove that [the pre-
sumed facts are not so]. If you believe evidence which you find
reasonably tends to prove that [the presumed facts are not so],
then you will disregard the presumption and decide whether, on
such portion of the whole evidence introduced by both sides as
you accept, [plaintiff] [defendant] has established by [the appro-
priate burden of proof instruction] the [presumed fact].
Note on Use:
This instruction is proper where the presumed facts have been
challenged by the introduction of evidence contrary to the pre-
sumed facts and the weight to be given to this evidence is for the
jury. It should not be given if the evidence is so overwhelming
as to warrant a reversal if it were disregarded.
Comment:
The proposed instruction is adapted from 1 NY PJI 1:63."
It is a sensible compromise between the Thayer view and the right
of the jury to disbelieve evidence. There is Washington authority
which supports this approach. There is also Washington author-
54 Wichl, supra note 14, at 396, n.98.
-5 See, e.g., Shaw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 158 Wash. 43, 290 Pac. 694 (1930).
-,3 See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
57 Chaloupska v. Cyr, 63 Wn. 2d 463, 466-67, 387 P.2d 740, 742-43 (1963) (pre-
sumption of negligence when property not perishable is delivered to a bailee in
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ity for the proposition that a presumption disappears entirely
from the case as a matter of law when the opponent introduces
competent evidence from either interested or disinterested wit-
nesses and where the testimony is uncontradicted, unimpeached,
clear and convincing." These two positions are not in conflict,
but rather, are simply a positive and a negative way of stating the
same rule-that if the weight of the evidence is a jury question,
the instruction should be given. On the other hand, if the evi-
dence is uncontradicted, unimpeached, clear and convincing, it
would be reversible error to permit the jury to disregard it. So,
where a question arises as to whether testimony is uncontra-
dicted, unimpeached, clear and convincing, a question is raised
for jury determination; the presumption is not dispelled as a
matter of law and the proposed instruction should be given to
the jury."
C. Rebuttable (i.e., Non-Conclusive) Presumptions, which affect the
burden of producing evidence, but which are permissive rather than
mandatory: "o
1. Where a presumption, statutory or common law, aids the state
in a criminal case:
The Instruction:
If you find [the basic fact] (as for example, that defendant
was present, in a hunting area, after sunset, with gun and flash-
light), then you may but your are not required to find [the pre-
sumed fact].
good condition and is returned damaged or not returned at all) ; Burrier v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 63 Wn. 2d 266, 387 P.2d 58 (1963) (presumption against suicide)
(But see the concurring opinion in Burrier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., supra,
which raises the point discussed in the text accompanying note 22 supra.) Kay v.
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 28 Wn. 2d 300, 183 P.2d 181 (1947) (presumption that false
statements knowingly made on an application for insurance were made with the intent
to deceive) ; Bradley v. Savidge, Inc., 13 Wn. 2d 28, 63-64, 123 P.2d 780, 795 (1942)
(presumption that driver of car involved in an accident was agent of the owner and
acting within the scope of his authority upon a showing of ownership) ; Gillingham v.
Phelps, 11 Wn. 2d 492, 119 P.2d 914 (1942) (presumption that title to personal prop-
erty passes to buyer when contract is made and in pursuance of that contract the goods
are delivered to the buyer).
58 See, e.g., Callen v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wn. 2d 180, 310 P.2d 236 (1957);
Bradley v. Savidge, Inc., supra note 57, at 63; collection of cases in MEISENHOLDER,
WAs HINGTON PRAcTIcE-EviDENc, chs. 31 & 32 (1965).
59 See, e.g., Burrier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 63 Wn. 2d 266, 387 P.2d 58 (1963);
In re Shaner's Estate, 41 Wn. 2d 236, 248 P.2d 560 (1952); Hanford v. Gochry,
24 Wn. 2d 859, 167 P.2d 678 (1946); Bradley v. Savidge, Inc., 13 Wn. 2d 28, 64,
123 P.2d 780, 795-96 (1942) ; collection of cases in MEISENHOLDER, op. Cit. supra note
58, chs. 31 & 32.
60 See note 45 supra and accompanying text
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Note on Use:
This instruction which must be permissive in form, may be used
where the defendant offers no evidence challenging or explaining
basic facts." It should be accompanied by a further instruction
directing the jury to consider the above instruction in the light of
presumption of innocence of the accused.2
Comment: '
D. Rebuttable (i.e., Non-Conclusive) Presumptions, which affect the
burden of proof:64
1. Where neither the basic facts nor the presumed facts have been
challenged:
The Instruction:
If you find [the basic facts], then you must find [the presumed
facts].
2. Where the basic facts have been challenged, but not the pre-
sumed facts:
The Instruction:
If you find [the basic facts], then you must find [the presumed
facts].
3. Where the presumed facts have been challenged:
The Instruction:
If you find [the basic facts], then you must find [the presumed
facts], unless you are convinced by [clear and convincing] [a
preponderance of the] evidence that [the presumed facts] [do not
exist] (or) [are not so].
61 United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (presumption of statutory illegal
operation of still arising from unexplained presence) ; State v. Person, 56 Wn. 2d 283,
352 P.2d 189 (1960) (statutory illegal hunting presumption) ; State v. Lew, 26 Wn.
2d 394, 400-02, 174 P.2d 291, 293-94 (1946) (presumption of guilt from flight). But see
State v. Hatfield, 65 Wash. 550, 118 Pac. 735 (1911) (presumption of defendant's
knowledge of falsity from the mere uttering of a forged instrument). See also note 45
supra.
62 State v Person, supra note 61.
62 See notes 45, 60 and 61 supra.
6-The new California Evidence Code specifically classifies the following pre-
sumptions as among those affecting the burden of proof: § 661, Legitimacy (contrast
with the conclusive presumption in § 621) ; § 662, Owner of legal title to property is
owner of beneficial title; § 663, Ceremonial marriage; § 664, Official duty regularly
performed (except as to an issue of lawful arrest) ; § 665, that a person is presumed
to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts (except to prove specific
intent in criminal cases); § 666, Judicial action, lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
§ 667, Death of person not heard from in seven years; § 668, unlawful intent presumed
from doing an unlawful act (except to establish specific intent in criminal cases)
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or, in the alternative:
In determining the existence of [the presumed facts] you
should consider the evidence against its existence, the inferences
that can reasonably be drawn from [the basic facts] if you find
[the basic facts], and any other fact bearing on this issue, and
you should find [the presumed facts] unless the evidence to the
contrary [is clear and convincing] [preponderates].
Note on Use:
This instruction should be used in all cases where the presumed
facts of a presumption affecting the burden of proof have been
challenged by evidence.
Comment:
Although the language of a number of Washington cases would,
apparently, support the position that the Washington Supreme
Court has classified certain presumptions as shifting the burden
of proof on the issue of the presumed facts of the presumption
if the basic facts are found by the jury," the uncertainty of the
law is a clear indication of the need for the authorative classifi-
cation of all known presumptions above suggested.'
In conclusion, the draftsman of pattern jury instructions on the
subject of presumptions would do well, as unfortunately I did not, to
heed the words of Judge Hale:
We hesitate to go into the legal area where presumptions abound, for it
is a place fraught with danger-in some areas an almost impenetrable
jungle, in others a mistladen morass-where more than one academician
has been known to lose his way and, once returned, is never quite the
same again.
65 E.g., Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., 172 Wash. 396, 20 P.2d 39 (1933) (presump-
tion of agency from ownership of a motor vehicle; burden on the opponent to over-
come the presumption by a fair preponderance of all the evidence). But see Bradley
v. Savidge, Inc., 13 Wn. 2d 28, 123 P.2d 780 (1942). In fraud cases, the presumption
of honesty and fair dealing must be rebutted by evidence that is clear, cogent and con-
vincing. Luna de la Peunta v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P.2d 753 (1936) ;
in criminal cases, the presumption of innocence attends the defendant until overcome
by the evidence, and guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tyree, 143
Wash. 313, 255 Pac. 382 (1927) ; in a suit to recover on a policy of life insurance.
defense-suicide, presumption against suicide remains in the case until it is overcome
by evidence to the contrary. Burrier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 63 Wn. 2d 266, 387 P.2d
58 (1963). Yet, note that in each of these examples the presumption operates against
the party who has the burden of proof, and only in the first example in, possibly, a
different degree.
6c See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
13 Burrier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 63 Wn. 2d 266, 274, 387 P.2d 58, 62 (1963).
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